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Abstract
In this note, we characterize the full set of equilibria of the 2-ﬁrm patent race
analyzed by Amaldoss and Jain (Management Science, 48(8), August 2002, pp. 972-
991). Contrary to Amaldoss and Jain’s (2002) claim, we show that the equilibrium
is not always unique and that the set of equilibria is non-robust to changes in the
(discrete) set of available strategies. In some equilibria, the qualitative results are
the reverse of those in the only equilibrium Amaldoss and Jain identify. Our ﬁndings
have important implications for the analysis of the data from Amaldoss and Jain’s
experiments, as well as other experiments appearing in the literature.
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11 Introduction
In a recent paper appearing in this journal, Amaldoss and Jain (2002) develop a simple model
of a contest. Two ﬁrms compete to win a patent, the “prize”, by simultaneously investing
in R&D. The ﬁrm that invests the higher amount wins the prize and receives a payoﬀ equal
to its value of the prize minus its investment. The ﬁrm that invests the lower amount loses
an amount equal to its investment. Both ﬁr m sf a c eas y m m e t r i cﬁnancial constraint which
prevents them from investing above a certain amount. This cap on investment is lower than
t h ev a l u eo ft h ep r i z ef o re i t h e rﬁrm.
Although the authors focus on a particular application, the game analyzed is a type
of all-pay auction with (identical) bid caps. The all-pay auction has been applied in the
literature on rent seeking and it is often noted that it can be used as a reduced form to
model R&D races.1 In fact, a very similar all-pay auction has been analyzed by Che and
Gale (1998) to model lobbying with expenditure caps.2
There are two major diﬀerences between the Amaldoss-Jain (henceforth A-J) and the
Che-Gale (henceforth C-G) treatments. One is that C-G assume that in the event of a tie in
expenditure the prize is either split or allocated with a fair randomizing device (henceforth
“partial dissipation”), whereas A-J’s main theoretical treatment assumes that in the event
of a tie in expenditure the value of the prize is completely dissipated and no one receives
the prize (henceforth “full dissipation”).3 A second major diﬀerence lies in the fact that A-J
assume a discrete (pure) strategy space, whereas the strategy space in C-G is continuous.4
In this note we demonstrate that several of the results obtained by A-J are erroneous,
including Proposition 1, the one and only proposition in the article. Contrary to the claim
of A-J’s Proposition 1, we show that under full dissipation the equilibrium is not always
unique. We provide an exhaustive characterization of the set of equilibria and show that
1See for instance Dasgupta (1986), Rosen (1988), and Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996). Baye and
Hoppe (2003) demonstrate that many other models of patent races appearing in the literature can be for-
mulated as Tullock rent seeking games, of which the all-pay auction is a special case.
2Che and Gale (1996a, 1996b) extend the analysis of the all-pay auction with ﬁnancially constrained
bidders and a continuous strategy space to the case of incomplete information and N ≥ 2 bidders.
3A-J also note that other tie breaking rules can be used and analyze an example that uses the prize
splitting rule employed by C-G. We comment further on this case below.
4For a treatment of the all-pay auction with a discrete strategy space in the absence of bid caps see Baye,
Kovenock and de Vries (1994).
2there is more than one equilibrium under fairly general conditions. We suspect that this
failure to recognize the existence of other equilibria stems from an erroneous claim used in
the proof of Proposition 1, namely that both ﬁrms always earn an expected proﬁt of zero
in a non-degenerate mixed-strategy equilibrium. We also examine some of the implications
of our analysis for the conclusions of the experimental investigation undertaken by A-J.
Speciﬁcally, we show that the error of imposing a zero proﬁt constraint carries over to
the partial dissipation experiment analyzed by A-J. The vectors of probabilities presented as
equilibrium strategies by A-J on page 984 of their article do not constitute a Nash equilibrium
of the game. In equilibrium, under “partial dissipation”, the ﬁr mw i t ht h el o w e rv a l u ed o e s
not necessarily invest more aggressively than the ﬁrm with the higher value as the authors
claim on page 977 (even with the additional assumptions mentioned on that page).
Below, we begin by introducing some notation. Then, we demonstrate that Amaldoss
and Jain’s major theoretical claims are erroneous and correct them. We end by discussing
the empirical implications of our results.
2 The model
Suppose there are two ﬁrms indexed by j, j ∈ {H,L}.F i r mj’s pure strategy space is given
by Xj = {0,c/k,2c/k,3c/k,...,c} with generic element xj. Thus ﬁrms have identical strategy
spaces. Let rj denote ﬁrm j’s value for the prize. Following A-J, let rH >r L >c .F i r mj’s
payoﬀ from playing xj when the other ﬁrm plays x−j is denoted by Πj(xj,x −j). Let t denote




    
    
rj − xj if xj >x −j,
trj − x if xj = x−j = x,
−xj if xj <x −j.
In the mixed extension of the game, let pj(x) denote a probability distribution over the
elements of Xj. Πj(pj,p −j) is then ﬁrm j0se x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ.
33 Equilibria under the “full dissipation” assumption
We show that equilibria that are qualitatively distinct from the equilibrium suggested by A-J
exist under fairly general conditions in the game they examine. This directly contradicts
their Proposition 1 and has important implications for empirical analyses of this type of
all-pay auction.
We begin by restating A-J’s Proposition 1 and its assumptions as they appear in the






rj − xj if xj >x −j,
−xj otherwise.
Proposition 1 (Amaldoss and Jain) If k>1, the unique equilibrium of this discrete














rL if i =0 ,1,...,k − 1,
1 − c
rL if i = k.
(1)














rH if i =0 ,1,...,k − 1,
1 − c
rH if i = k.
(2)







rL 0 ≤ x<c







rH 0 ≤ x<c
1 x ≥ c.
(4)
Claim 1 below provides a complete characterization of the set of equilibria of the discrete
“full dissipation” game with discrete strategy space. It shows that equilibria that do not
satisfy (1) and (2) exist fairly generally. These equilibria have an alternating structure,
where one ﬁrm’s support contains the even points of the strategy space and the other ﬁrm’s
4contains the odd points. In these alternating equilibria, one ﬁrm earns a strictly positive
expected proﬁt, and the other ﬁrm earns zero.
Claim 1 Assume k>1.I fk is odd, there exist three Nash equilibria. One equilibrium is
characterized by (1) and (2) and satisﬁes Π∗
H = Π∗
L =0 . The two other equilibria are given
by (p∗
j,p ∗











    













if i = k
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rj if i =2 ,4,...,k − 1
0 if i =1 ,3,...,k
(6)
In such equilibria, expected payoﬀsa r ee q u a lt oΠ∗
j = rj −c>0 and Π∗
−j =0 , j ∈ {H,L}.I f
k is even, there exists a unique equilibrium characterized by (1) and (2).
The proof of claim 1 appears in the Appendix. The reason why A-J claim uniqueness of
equilibrium in their Proposition 1 whereas our Claim 1 demonstrates nonuniqueness is that
the proof of A-J’s Proposition 1, provided in part A of their Technical Appendix, contains an
error.5 The statement directly preceding Equation (A12) in A-J’s Lemma A4 is not correct.
Showing that the system (A12) has a unique solution is not suﬃcient to prove uniqueness
of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. The system (A12) is written with an equality
in every row, while it should be written with an inequality (≤)i ne v e r yr o w ,s i n c ew h e na
pure strategy is played with probability zero it may indeed yield an expected payoﬀ that
is strictly below the speciﬁed equilibrium level. This is exactly the reasoning used in the
proof of Claim 1 in this note, which follows the general programming framework for solving
for the Nash equilibria of all-pay auctions with discrete strategy spaces developed in Baye,
Kovenock, and De Vries (1994).6
5The Technical Appendices can be found on the INFORMS website at
http://mansci.pubs.informs.org/ecompanion.html.
6The second part of A-J’s Proposition 1 concerns the continuous strategy space equilibrium that is the
limit of the discrete equilibria that they identify as the mesh of the discrete grid of feasible expenditures
54 Empirical implications
Based on Claim 1, we now reconsider Results 2 and 3 appearing on Page 975 of Amaldoss
and Jain (2002). Result 2 states that “[o]n average, ﬁrm L invests more than ﬁrm H.”
Result 3 states that “[f]irm L is more likely to win the patent.” These two results are not
true in the equilibrium where the high-value ﬁrm earns a strictly positive expected proﬁt.
Therefore, the “counterintuitive” result that the low-value ﬁrm invests more aggressively in
the patent race than the high-value ﬁrm is speciﬁc to a particular class of equilibria in which
the high-value ﬁrm earns zero expected proﬁt.
Claim 2 There exists an equilibrium in which Results 2 and 3 of A-J are reversed.
Suppose that k>1 and k is an odd number:
(i) In the equilibrium in which Π∗
H > 0, ﬁrm L invests less than ﬁrm H on average and is
less likely to win the patent than ﬁrm H.
(ii) In all equilibria in which Π∗
H =0 , ﬁrm L invests more than ﬁrm H on average and is
more likely to win the patent than ﬁrm H.
Suppose that k>1 and k is an even number:
(iii) In the unique equilibrium, ﬁrm L invests more than ﬁrm H on average and is more
likely to win the patent than ﬁrm H.
The proof of Claim 2 appears in the Appendix. In Amaldoss and Jain (2002), Proposition
1 is used as a theoretical prediction against which data from experiments are evaluated.
The strategy space chosen by the authors for the experiments is such that k =2 .I n
this particular case, we showed in Claim 1 that the equilibrium is unique and coincides
with the one described in Proposition 1 of A-J. However, we question whether an all-pay
auction with only three possible levels of investment is apt for modeling a patent race.
More speciﬁcally, for the parameters chosen for the sessions of the experiments with full
dissipation, the equilibrium predicts that ﬁrms’ mixed strategies yield a tie in investment,
goes to zero. Corresponding to the equilibria that we identify are continuous strategy space equilibria that
have the property that one ﬁrm places a mass point at zero and the other ﬁrm a mass point at c. A correct
analysis of the continuous case under “partial dissipation” may be found in Che and Gale (1998).
6and thus no ﬁrm wins the patent race, in roughly 43% of the cases. Hence, the full dissipation
assumption provides a player with a strong incentive to avoid investing the same amount as
the other player. We argue that such incentives do not seem to reﬂect the reality of a patent
race.7 In support of the qualitative nature of their ﬁndings with a three point strategy space,
t h ea u t h o r sn o t e( A - J ,p . 9 7 8 ,f o o t n o t e7 )t h a tr e l a t e dw o r kb yR a p o p o r ta n dA m a l d o s s
(2000) shows that the results are robust to increases in the set of feasible strategies. Indeed,
Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000) examine a game with six feasible strategies, a space that,
contrary to the claims of the authors, yields multiple Nash equilibria. However, in the
Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000) experiments, players place on average higher probability at
a 0 investment than is predicted by the only equilibrium they identify (which corresponds
to that in Proposition 1 of A-J with rH = rL). In a separate note (Dechenaux, Kovenock
and Lugovskyy 2003), we examine how the experimental ﬁndings of Rapoport and Amaldoss
(2000) appear consistent with at least a subset of players sometimes playing asymmetric
equilibria of the type derived in this note.
Above we argued that it is the failure to allow for the possibility that a single player need
not play all feasible pure strategies with positive probability in equilibrium that causes A-J
to arrive at the false conclusion (A-J, p. 976) that “if a ﬁrm gets zero from not investing,
then its expected payoﬀsf r o mi n v e s t i n gap o s i t i v ea m o u n tm u s ta l s ob ez e r o . ”T h i sl e a d s
A-J to erroneously conclude that equilibrium proﬁts must be zero for both ﬁrms. Indeed, the
error of assuming that both ﬁrms must earn zero proﬁt in equilibrium carries over to A-J’s
treatment of the partial dissipation case, where even a zero expenditure does not generally
lead to a zero expected proﬁt. The authors examine the behavioral implications of the partial
dissipation case where c =2 ,r L =2 .2,r H =2 .9 and t = 1
2. A-J claim that “the equilibrium
solutions for this case are (A-J, p. 984):”
pH =( pH(0),p H(1),p H(2)) = (0.0909,0.7272,0.1818),
pL =( pL(0),p L(1),p L(2)) = (0.3103,0.0689,0.6207).
We claim that the statement above is erroneous, as under the assumptions made by the
authors, (pH,p L) does not constitute an equilibrium of the game. In a Nash equilibrium, if
7The literature on contest approaches to patent races also generally assumes partial dissipation in the
event of a tie and not full dissipation. See Dasgupta (1986).
7x and z are in the support of ﬁrm j’s mixed strategy:
Πj(x,p−j)=Πj(z,p−j).
But then, using the probabilities suggested by the authors:
ΠL(0,p H)=0 .0909 × 0.5 × 2.2=0 .09999 >
ΠL(1,p H)=0 .0909 × 2.2+0 .7272 × 0.5 × 2.2 − 1=−0.0001.
On page C1 of A-J’s Technical Appendix, the statement preceding equations (C1), (C2)
and (C3) is incorrect. If both ﬁrms play 0 with positive probability, they obtain a strictly
positive expected proﬁta t0. Thus, the system of equations that follows the statement does
not characterize an equilibrium.
We now compute the correct equilibrium probabilities assuming that every pure strategy
is in the support of each ﬁrm for a general k and t = 1
2. Recall that a ﬁrm’s payoﬀ under
partial dissipation is given by:
Πj(xj,x −j)=

    
    
rj − xj if xj >x −j,
1
2rj − x if xj = x−j = x,
−xj if xj <x −j.
A-J focus on a class of equilibria in which each ﬁrm’s support contains all pure strategies.
Knowing that in equilibrium at each point of its support a ﬁrm earns the same expected
payoﬀ, Π∗
j, we can characterize this type of equilibrium by the following system of equations
for j ∈ {L,H}: 
       

















In addition, we know that all probabilities are nonnegative and the probabilities sum to



































pj(0) = 1. (10)





= r−j should hold. But this contradicts the fact that rH >r L and
thus an equilibrium with the speciﬁed properties does not exist for k odd. For k even,
pj(0) = 1 − c



















− 1 for i odd.
(11)
Using (11) to calculate the equilibrium solution yields:
pH =( pH(0),p H(1),p H(2)) = (0.0909,0.8181,0.0909),
pL =( pL(0),p L(1),p L(2)) = (0.3103,0.3793,0.3103).
On page 977 A-J claim that the qualitative implications of their theoretical results derived
for t =0hold for every t ∈ [0, 1
2] given that, in equilibrium, both ﬁrms randomize over all
pure strategies. One of these implications is that ﬁrm L invests more on average than ﬁrm





































As we can see, in equilibrium both ﬁrms invest an equal amount on average, which contradicts
the claim made by A-J.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this note, we have applied methods developed in Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1994)
to illustrate some of the pitfalls of characterizing the complete set of Nash equilibria in
9contests with a discrete strategy space. We have shown that Amaldoss and Jain (2002)
have erroneously characterized the set of Nash equilibria for discrete strategy spaces under
full dissipation (A-J, Proposition 1) and have misspeciﬁed the equilibrium strategies in their
experimental test of the partial dissipation case.
The experiments carried out by A-J for the full dissipation case employ a game with a
strategy space with three feasible strategies and a unique Nash equilibrium. A-J justify the
choice of such a restricted strategy set by appealing to its simplicity and to the robustness of
the set of equilibria to increases in the number of possible strategies. However, our theoretical
results show that the set of equilibria is not robust to increases in the number of possible
strategies, invalidating A-J’s justiﬁcation. In a companion piece (Dechenaux, Kovenock,
and Lugovskyy 2003), we examine how the experimental ﬁndings of Rapoport and Amaldoss
(2000) appear consistent with at least a subset of players sometimes playing asymmetric
equilibria of the type derived in this note.
Since experimental testing requires discrete strategy spaces, careful attention should be
paid to completely characterizing the equilibria of the game to be tested. It is somewhat
troubling that the set of equilibria in the all-pay auction with common caps on expenditures
is non-robust to the cardinality of the strategy space. Indeed, it is hard to understand how
experimental subjects could uncover (unstable) mixed strategy equilibria when it is diﬃcult
for trained researchers in the management sciences to do so.
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117 Appendix
P r o o fo fC l a i m1 :
We prove Claim 1 through a series of Lemmata. It follows from Nash (1950) that an
equilibrium exists. Throughout the proof, let S ≡ {0, c
k,2 c
k,...,c} and let (p∗
H,p ∗
L) be an
equilibrium of the game. For a given equilibrium (p∗
H,p ∗
L), let p∗
j(x) be the associated prob-
ability that ﬁrm j plays x, Sj the associated support of ﬁrm j’s distribution, and Π∗
j its
expected proﬁt in that equilibrium, j ∈ {H,L}.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium (p∗
H,p ∗
L), SH ∪SL = S. Consequently, Π∗
j =0for at least one
j, j ∈ {H,L}.
Proof. First, we show that (i) if a point v c
k,v>0, is in the support of at least one ﬁrm,
then all points n c
k where 0 ≤ n<vm u s tb ei nt h es u p p o r to fa tl e a s to n eﬁrm. This implies
that (ii) 0 is in the support of at least one ﬁrm. Then, we use (ii) to show that (iii), c is in
the support of at least one ﬁrm. Combining (i) and (iii) completes the proof of the lemma.
We ﬁrst show (i). Let v be a strictly positive integer with v c
k ∈ Sj for some j ∈ {H,L}.
Suppose contrary to our claim that there exists an n<vsuch that n c
k / ∈ SH∪SL. This implies
that there exists some u ≤ v such that u c
k ∈ Sl for some l ∈ {H,L} and (u−1) c
k / ∈ SH ∪SL.
Then, ﬁrm l’s expected payoﬀ of playing u c
















and ﬁrm l’s expected proﬁto fp l a y i n g(u − 1) c
























k),w eh a v eΠl(u c
k) < Πl((u − 1) c
k). Therefore, u c
k
c a n n o tb ei nt h es u p p o r to fﬁrm l’s equilibrium distribution, a contradiction. Thus, we have
established (i).
We now turn to (ii). First note that ﬁrm j’s expected proﬁto fp l a y i n g0 is, regardless of
its opponent’s strategy:
Πj(0) = 0.
12Suppose to the contrary that 0 / ∈ SL ∪ SH.L e ti ≡ mini{i|i c
k ∈ SH ∪ SL}.S u p p o s ew i t h o u t
loss of generality that i c





















k)=0 , ∀n<i , a contradiction to the fact that i c
k ∈ Sl0.T h u s0 ∈ SL ∪ SH.
To complete the proof of the lemma, we show (iii). Suppose to the contrary that c/ ∈









)rj − c = rj − c>0, for j ∈ {H,L},
whereas its expected proﬁtf r o mp l a y i n g0 is:
Πj(0) = 0.
But, by (ii) above, 0 must be in the support of at least one ﬁrm j, a contradiction. Hence,
we have established (iii).
Combining (i) and (iii), we have shown that SH ∪SL = S.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,Π∗
j = Πj(0) = 0
for at least one j, which proves the lemma. Q.E.D.




k) > 0 and p∗
L(i c
k) > 0,t h e np∗
H(nc
k) > 0 and
p∗
L(nc
k) > 0, for every n such that 0 ≤ n<i .
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there exists an investment v c
k such that p∗
j(v c
k) > 0,
j ∈ {H,L} and n<vsuch that p∗
l((v − 1) c
k)=0for some l ∈ {H,L}.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t
there exists u, u ≤ v such that u c
k ∈ SH∩SL a n ds u c ht h a t(u−1) c
k / ∈ Sl for some l ∈ {H,L}.
From Lemma 1 it follows that since p∗
l((u−1) c
k)=0 ,t h e np∗
−l((u−1) c
k) > 0.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
ﬁrm −l’s expected proﬁta tu c











































k). It then follows that Π−l((u−1) c
k) >
Π−l(u c
k), contradicting u c
k ∈ S−l. Q.E.D.
13Lemma 3 In any equilibrium (p∗
H,p ∗
L), if Π∗
l > 0 for some l ∈ {H,L},t h e n :
(i) SH ∩ SL = ∅,
(ii) Firm l randomizes over all pure strategies i c
k for which i is odd and ﬁrm −l randomizes
over all pure strategies i c




l > 0 implies 0 / ∈ Sl.T h u s ,f r o mL e m m a1 ,0 ∈ S−l. It follows that c
k / ∈ S−l
since ﬁrm −l can increase its expected proﬁtb ym o v i n gm a s sf r o mc
k to 0. Then, from
Lemma 1, c
k ∈ Sl.S u p p o s e2 c
k ∈ Sl.T h e nw h e t h e r2 c
k is in S−l or not, ﬁrm l can increase
its expected payoﬀ by moving all mass from 2 c
k to c
k.T h u s2c
k / ∈ Sl, from which it follows
that 2 c
k ∈ S−l. Suppose now that 3c
k ∈ S−l. Then, whether 3 c
k is in Sl or not, ﬁrm −l can
increase its expected payoﬀ by moving all mass from 3c
k to 2 c
k (recall that ﬁrm l puts no
mass at 2c
k). Since k is ﬁnite, it is straightforward to see that the same argument applies
recursively to every i ≤ k. That is, suppose i c
k ∈ Sm and i c
k / ∈ S−m,t h e n(i +1 )c
k / ∈ Sm and
(i +1 )c
k ∈ S−m, ∀i ∈ {0,1,...,k} and m ∈ {H,L}.
(iii) follows immediately from the fact that 0 ∈ S−l. Q.E.D.




L =0 ,t h e nSH = SL = S.
Proof. Let ij ≡ maxi{i|i c
k ∈ Sj} and i ≡ max{iH,iL}. We claim that iH = iL = i = k. Sup-
pose il > i−l. Then it is clear that Πl(il) > 0, a contradiction to Π∗
l =0 .T h u siH = iL = i.
Applying Lemma 1, i = k. The claim then follows from Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5 There exists an equilibrium (p∗
H,p ∗
L) with payoﬀs Π∗
H = Π∗
L =0 . In this equilib-














rL if i =0 ,1,...,k − 1,
1 − c














rH if i =0 ,1,...,k − 1,
1 − c
rH if i = k.
14Proof. If (p∗
H,p ∗
L) is an equilibrium with payoﬀs Π∗
H = Π∗
L =0 , then from Lemma 4, it
follows immediately that SL = SH = S. We establish existence by construction. Since
SL = SH = S and both ﬁrms obtain an expected proﬁto f0, if the following pair of matrix
e q u a t i o n si ss a t i s ﬁed (with equality) for j = H,L, we have constructed such an equilibrium:





... ... ... ... ... ...
rj rj ... rj rj 0

      

























      

(13)
For a given j ∈ {H,L}, (13) is a system of k +1equations and k +1unknowns. If the
leftmost matrix is non-singular, then (13) has a unique solution. The determinant of the
leftmost matrix is equal to (−1)
k+2 (rj)
k 6=0 . Therefore (13) has a unique solution.











rjk > 0. The remaining probabilities can be solved by repeated sub-
stitution of c
rjk in place of p∗





rj for i ∈ {0,1,...,k − 1}
and p∗
−j(c)=1− c
rj.S i n c erj >c>ic
k by assumption, the solutions to (13) are probabilities.
Uniqueness of an equilibrium satisfying the conditions in the lemma follows immediately from
Lemma 4 and the fact that such an equilibrium must satisfy the system (13), for j ∈ {H,L}.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 6 An equilibrium with Π∗
l > 0 for some l, l ∈ {H,L},e x i s t si fa n do n l yi fk is odd.
If k is odd, then there exist exactly two such equilibria (p∗
l,p ∗











    













if i = k












    













rl if i =2 ,4,...,k − 1
0 if i =1 ,3,...,k
15Proof. We prove existence by construction. Let l be the ﬁrm obtaining Π∗
l > 0 and let the
other ﬁrm be −l. From Lemma 3, the equilibrium must be of the alternating form, and ﬁrm
l must play pure strategies i c
k for which i is an odd number.
Suppose k is even. It follows that c is in S−l but not in Sl. Therefore Π∗
−l = r−l −c>0.
But this and Π∗
l > 0 contradict Lemma 3. Therefore no equilibria with Π∗
l > 0 exist when k
is even, which proves the “only if” part of the statement.
Suppose k is odd. Then by Lemma 3, Sl = {1,3 c
k,...,c} and S−l = {0,2c
k,...,(k − 1) c
k}.
It follows that Π∗
l = rl − c.F r o mL e m m a3 ,f o rﬁrm −l, the strictly positive p∗
−l(x)’s must
be the solution to the following system of k+1
2 equations:

       

















−l((k − 1) c
k)]rl − k c
k
This system of equations can be written in matrix form:

      

rl 00... 0
rl rl 0 ... 0
... ... ... ... ...
rl rl rl ... rl

      











−l((k − 1) c
k)















l + k c
k

      

. (14)
Note that the number of equations coincides with the number of unknowns. The de-
terminant of the ﬁrst matrix equals (rl)
(k+1)/2 > 0.T h i s i s s u ﬃcient to prove uniqueness
of the solution. Moreover, in equilibrium Π∗
l = rl − c = p∗
−l(0)rl − c
k. Solving the system
by repeated substitution yields p∗








> 0 and p∗
−l(i c
k)= 2c
rlk > 0 for
i ∈ {2,...,(k − 1) c






















so they are indeed probabilities.
We now turn to ﬁrm l’s strategy. Note that ﬁrm −l obtains an expected payoﬀ of 0 in
equilibrium, Π∗
−l =0 . From Lemma 3, the strictly positive p∗




       


















l((k − 2) c
k)]r−l − (k − 1)c
k
This system of equations can be written in matrix form:

      

r−l 00... 0
r−l r−l 0 ... 0
... ... ... ... ...
r−l r−l r−l ... r−l

      












l((k − 2) c
k)












(k − 1) c
k

      

. (15)
Note that the number of equations coincides with the number of unknowns. The deter-
minant of the ﬁrst matrix equals (r−l)
(k−1)/2 > 0. T h i si ss u ﬃcient to prove uniqueness of
the solution. Solving the system by repeated substitution yields p∗
l(i c
k)= 2c
r−lk > 0,w h e r e
2c
r−lk < 1,f o ra l li ∈ {1,3,...,k − 2}. Using the fact that probabilities must sum to 1 to solve
for p∗










Uniqueness of an equilibrium (p∗
j,p ∗
h) satisfying Π∗
j > 0 and Π∗
h =0follows from Lemma
3 and the fact that such an equilibrium must satisfy the systems (14) and (15). Thus using
Lemma 3, if k is odd, there exists exactly one equilibrium in which Π∗
H > 0 and exactly one
equilibrium in which Π∗
L > 0. Q.E.D.
To complete the proof of the claim, it suﬃces to note that Lemma 1 implies that there
a r en oe q u i l i b r i ai nw h i c hb o t hﬁrms earn a strictly positive expected proﬁt. Therefore, all
equilibria of the game are characterized by Lemma 5 and Lemma 6. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fC l a i m2 :
The proof of (iii) can be found on Pages 975-976 of A-J, below Results 2 and 3. Uniqueness
of the equilibrium in this case follows from Claim 1.
Now consider the equilibria in which Π∗
j > 0 and Π∗
−j =0 . First, from Claim 1, such




























(2 + 4 + ...+ k − 1). (17)
Using the fact that:
1+3+5+...+ k =


































Now using the fact that:













Using the expressions for E[xj] and E[xj], we obtain:
E[xj] − E[x−j]=
"























Therefore in the equilibrium in which Π∗
j > 0, ﬁrm j invests more than ﬁrm −j on average,
j ∈ {H,L}.





























































Therefore in the equilibrium in which Π∗
j > 0, ﬁrm j is more likely to win the patent than
ﬁrm −j, j ∈ {H,L}. The argument for the equilibrium in which Π∗
H = Π∗
L =0in (ii) is
similar to the one used to prove (iii). This completes the proof of Claim 2. Q.E.D.
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